

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10
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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5679
INFO USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT POUCH

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 3178

E.O.11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, JO, XF
SUBJECT: COURT CHIEF SHARAF--JORDAN'S ARAB STRATEGY

SUMMARY: SHARAF HAS PROVIDED US JORDANIAN STRATEGY
UNDERLYING KING'S CALL FOR ARAB SUMMIT. GOJ CON-
CERNED BY DRIFT AND DISUNITY IN ARAB WORLD ALLOWING
PLO AND RADICALS TO TAKE POLITICAL LEAD, AND FEARS
RADICAL SHIFT TOWARD WAR IF MODERATES DO NOT ASSERT
THEIR VIEWS. WHILE RECOGNIZING CALL FOR SUMMIT
PREMATURE, JORDAN SEEKING THROUGH FORMULATION OF
SPECIFIC SUMMIT AGENDA TO BRING ARABS, PARTICULARLY
MODERATES, TOGETHER ON AS MANY POINTS OF COMMON
AGREEMENT AND NON-DIVISIVE ELEMENTS AS POSSIBLE
IN ORDER TO BUILD BACKFIRE AGAINST RADICALS,
CONTROL PALESTINIANS, AND PRESERVE OPPORTUNITIES FOR
PEACE, INCLUDING PURSUIT SADAT INITIATIVE. SHARAF

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PUT EMPHASIS ALSO ON DEFENSIVE NATURE OF STRATEGY,
NOTING IT AROSE AS A RESULT OF ISRAELI SOUTH
LEBANON INCURSION AND WAS DESIGNED TO GET ARABS
TO WORK TOGETHER IN FACE OF RENEWED AND HEIGHTENED
THREAT FROM ISRAEL. FOR JORDAN, STRATEGY SEEN AS
WAY FEND OFF PRESSURES AND ARAB INTERFERENCE, AND,
MOST IMPORTANTLY, CONSTRUCT RATIONALE ALLOWING

JORDAN AVOID FUTURE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATIONS IF
ITS IDEAS NOT ACCEPTED. END SUMMARY

1. IN MEETING APRIL 6, SHARAF PROVIDED SOME
DETAILS AND EXPLANATIONS OF JORDAN'S ARAB STRATEGY.

2. SHARAF HIGHLIGHTED JORDANIAN CONCERNS THAT
ARAB WORLD WAS NOW DRIFTING AND THAT DIRECTION
WOULD BE MORE RADICAL AND DIVISIVE IF NOT COUNTERED.
IN ADDITION, THE PLO EXERCISED A KIND OF DEAD
HAND OF INFLUENCE OVER ALL POSITIVE ARAB PEACE
INITIATIVES AND IT HAD TO BE CUT DOWN TO SIZE AND
BROUGHT INTO LINE. FINALLY, JORDAN WAS WORRIED
THAT THE MORE RADICAL ARABS WOULD ONCE AGAIN DRAG
THE REGION INTO WAR AND THEN PRESSURE JORDAN TO
JOIN. TO BUILD A DEFENSE IN DEPTH, JORDAN WANTED
TO ESTABLISH A RECORD OF CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS, WHICH,
IF REFUSED BY THE OTHER ARABS, WOULD AT LEAST LEAVE JORDAN
RELATIVELY FREE TO GO ITS OWN WAY IN A CRUNCH WITH
NO OBLIGATIONS ESTABLISHED WITH ANY OF ITS NEIGHBORS.
FINALLY, JORDAN KNOWS ITS CALLS FOR A SUMMIT ARE
PREMATURE AND EXPECTS THAT A LONG PERIOD OF INTER-ARAB
NEGOTIATION WILL HAVE TO TAKE PLACE BEFORE ANYTHING
DEVELOPS. IN THE MEANTIME, JORDAN'S ACTIVITY LEAVES
SADAT RELATIVELY FREE TO PURSUE HIS PEACE EFFORTS
WHILE THE OTHER ARABS STAND IN THE WAY OF, OR
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ASIDE FROM, POSITIVE SUGGESTIONS BY JORDAN.

3. THE OPENING GUN OF JORDAN'S INITIATIVE WAS KING'S
CALL FOR A SUMMIT AND HIS EMOTIONAL POSO-SOUTH
LEBANON INVASION SPEECH. THE SECOND STEP WAS A SERIES

OF VISITS BY SENIOR JORDANIANS TO KEY ARAB
LEADERS. THE THIRD WILL BE ANOTHER ROUND OF VISITS
IN WHICH THE EMISSARIES TAKE AN AGENDA PAPER PRE-
PARED BY JORDAN TO ARAB CAPITALS.

4. SHARAF GAVE ME A DEBRIEF ON HIS MEETINGS LAST WEEK
WITH ASAD, THE SAUDIS (KHALID, FAHD, SAUD BIN FEISAL),
AND JABAR OF KUWAIT. ASAD HAD BEEN THE TOUGHEST.
KHADDAM ACCUSED JORDAN OF USING THE SUMMIT IDEA TO
AID SADAT; SHARAF SAID HE TOLD HIM ON THE CONTRARY
THAT IT WAS TO PROTECT SYRIA WHICH HAD JUST BEEN
SHAMED BY FAILING TO REACT TO THE ISRAELI INVASION
OF LEBANON. ASAD HAD BEEN VERY DIFFICULT AND LENGTHY
(FOUR HOURS). THE SYRIANS WERE MOST OPPOSED TO A
SUMMIT OF ALL THE ARABS. HE GOT TWO CONCESSIONS

FROM ASAD--THAT HE WOULD MEET WITH SADAT IF THE
LATTER RENOUNCED HIS PEACE INITIATIVE. SHARAF
LAUGHED AND SAID PREVIOUSLY ASAD WAS INSISTING ON
SADAT'S TOTAL DISAPPEARANCE. SECONDLY, A SUMMIT CONFERENCE
FOR SYRIA TO ATTEND SHOULD HAVE A PLAN OR AGENDA. AS A RESULT
JORDAN AGREED TO PREPARE CONCRETE, WRITTEN
PROPOSALS FOR SUMMIT CONSIDERATION.

5. THE SAUDIS HAD BEEN MORE INTERESTED THAN JORDAN
HAD EXPECTED, AND KUWAIT HAD GONE ALONG. TENTATIVELY
THE THREE (JORDAN, KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA) AGREED TO FORM A
COORDINATING COMMITTEE TO CANVASS ARAB OPINION AND CALL FOR THE
SUMMIT. LATER SAUDI BIN FEISAL HAD PULLED BACK, SUGGESTING
SUDAN DO THIS JOB SINCE NUMEYRI WAS CHAIRMAN OF THE ARAB LEAGUE
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THIS SEASON, AND SEEK HELP FROM JORDAN AND OTHERS.
SHARAF SAID SUDANESE HAVE NO INTEREST IN OR CAPACITY
TO ORGANIZE A SUMMIT AND SAYS JORDAN SEES SADAT'S
FINE HAND AT WORK IN THESE PROCEEDINGS. SHARAF
SEEMED UNDETERRED, SAYING THAT NO SUMMIT WILL TAKE
PLACE FOR A LONG TIME, BUT WITHOUT ANY PREPARATORY
WORK THE GAME WILL GO TO THE WILD MEN. JORDAN AT
LEAST CAN EMBARRASS THE OTHERS BY MAKING SENSIBLE
PROPOSALS.

6. AS A RESULT JORDANIANS HAVE PROPOSED PAPER AND
WILL CIRCULATE IT IN ARAB CAPITALS NEXT WEEK. BASIC
THESIS OF PAPER IS THAT ARABS, AND PARTICULARLY CON-
FRONTATION STATES, HAVE TO COME TOGETHER ON AS MANY
POINTS OF COMMON AGREEMENT AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT
DISTURBING THEIR IDEOLOGICAL PREDILECTIONS OR
RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE BIG POWERS. IT TREATS
A WHOLE SERIES OF SECTORS AND THE FOLLOWING ARE
SOME OF THE DETAILS. (SHARAF SAYS IT IS BASED ON
IDEAS WHICH HUSSEIN PRESENTED AT THE FIRST ARAB SUMMIT
IN THE EARLY SIXTIES, WHICH WERE ACCEPTED IN THE MAIN THEN AND
HAVE NOW BEEN FORGOTTEN, OR ARE UNKNOWN TO THE CURRENT CROP
OF ARAB LEADERS).

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5680

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT POUCH

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 AMMAN 3178

(A) POLITICAL AREA - PAPER FOCUSSES ON INTER-ARAB RELATIONS, ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE AND PEACE. AMONG ARABS, RESPECT FOR STATES' SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS SHOULD PREVAIL WHATEVER POLITICAL SYSTEMS ARE BEING FOLLOWED. STATES CAN KEEP THEIR OTHER DOCTRINES AND NON-ARAB (ESPECIALLY BIG POWER) TIES. THE ARABS SHOULD REAFFIRM THEIR READINESS FOR A FULL PEACE, WITH A DEFINITION OF PEACE AIRMS, BUT THIS SHOULD BE COUPLED WITH A STRONG STATEMENT OF DETERMINATION TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST FURTHER ISRAELI EXPANSION;

(B) DEFENSE - SUGGESTION HERE IS FOR MORE COORDINATION OF MILITARY EFFORTS AND FOR GREATER STRENGTHENING OF SUPPORT FOR THE CONFRONTATION STATES;

(C) ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL - THE ARABS WOULD AGREE TO DEFINITE PLANS FOR SUPPORT BY THE WEALTHY OF THE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENT OF THE OTHERS. COMMITMENTS FOR GRANTS AND LOANS WOULD BE MADE IN THIS AREA
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AND FIRM PLANS REACHED AS WELL ON THE INVESTMENT OF ARAB RESOURCES;

(D) INFORMATION - AGREEMENT WOULD BE REACHED FOR A COORDINATED PROGRAM OF INFORMATION ACTIVITIES IN THE WEST OF A NON-CONFRONTATIONAL, DIALOGUE CHARACTER;

(E) PALESTINIANS - EFFORTS WOULD BE MADE TO AGREE TO TRY TO REMOVE THE PALESTINIANS FROM BEING PAWNS OF THE INDIVIDUAL ARAB STATES AND INSTEAD PLACE THEIR FUTURE IN THE CONTEXT OF COOPERATIVE WORK GOALS OF ALL OF THE ARABS. EFFORTS WOULD ALSO

BE MADE TO UNIFY THE PALESTINIANS, SUBORDINATE THEM TO THE COMMON DESIRES OF THE OTHERS, AND DEFUSE THEIR CAPACITY TO MAKE TROUBLE.

(F) SADAT INITIATIVES - SHARAF WAS CAREFUL TO POINT OUT THAT JORDANIAN IDEA WAS THAT SADAT INITIATIVES WOULD NOT BE CONDEMNED IN THE SUMMIT PROCESS AND THAT POLITICAL STEPS WOULD BE PICKED UP WHEREVER THE INITIATIVES WERE AT THE TIME THE SUMMIT MET (HE PRESUMED THEY WOULD NOT BE FAR ADVANCED AND THAT ALL EFFORTS WOULD BE MADE TO AVOID ANY CONDEMNATION OF THE STEPS SADAT HAD TAKEN. (HE DID NOT SAY, BUT WE PRESUME FROM HIS PRESENTATION, THAT NEITHER WOULD EFFORTS BE MADE TO PRAISE THEM. THE TREATMENT WOULD BE "FACTUAL AND OBJECTIVE.")

7. COMMENT: SHARAF WAS QUICK TO ADMIT THAT ALL OF THIS SOUNDS MASSIVELY UTOPIAN AND SELF-SERVING, AND TOO SELF-SACRIFICING ON THE PART OF THE ARABS TO BE TRUE. WE CERTAINLY AGREE. JORDANIANS HOWEVER SEE SOME CLEAR ADVANTAGES. IT HELPED TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON NON-DIVISIVE ACTIVITIES AMONG THE ARABS WHICH IS IMPORTANT FOR JORDAN. AS ARAB DIVISIONS MULTIPLY THE STRAINS ON JORDAN TO SUBDIVIDE INCREASE. IT ALSO HAS A FAINT POSSIBILITY OF

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GARNERING SOME ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR THE CONFRONTATION SOATES, INCLUDING RENEWAL OF 1974 RABAT SUBSIDIES. MOST OF WHAT IS ASKED FOR IS UNEXCEPTIONABLE AND ALSO SERVES TO PROTECT JORDAN AGAINST OUTSIDE ARAB INTERFERENCE AND THUS CAN HELP THE JORDANIANS OPPOSE RADICAL ARAB PRESSURES. FINALLY, SHARAF ALSO MADE CLEAR THE PROCESS BUYS TIME FOR SADAT, IS A GOOD WAY FOR JORDAN TO BUILD UP A RATIONALE (AND AN EXCUSE) FOR STAYING OUT OF FUTURE DUST-UPS IF ITS IDEAS ARE NOW TURNED DOWN IN THE OTHERS, AND CREATES SOME BACK PRESSURE AGAINST THE RADICALS, WHO UP UNTIL NOW, HAVE HAD A RATHER FREE HAND. SHARAF DID NOT MENTION POSSIBILITY SUMMIT COULD FURTHER NEGATE INDIRECTLY OR AT LEAST PARTIALLY UNDERMINE 1974 RABAT SUMMIT DECISION GIVING PLO AUTHORITY OVER PALESTINIAN/WEST BANK MATTERS, BUT WE SUSPECT SUCH A STRATEGY MIGHT BE A FACTOR IN JORDAN'S THINKING, OR AT LEAST ANOTHER OBJECTIVE IN FORCING PLO TO DECLARE ITSELF ONE WAY OR ANOTHER ON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. PICKERING

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